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TITLE VII, VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND RICCI: RESCUING 
MUNICIPALITIES FROM A LEGAL ‘BACKDRAFT’ 
JARED D. STUECKLE* 
The Supreme Court recently decided Ricci v. DeStefano, a case that had 
municipalities throughout the United States holding their breath. This case presents a 
scenario where either action by a municipal employer would result in potential liability 
under Title VII. Thus, the policy goal of Title VII—encouraging the voluntary 
compliance of employers by relaxing standards for liability when these attempts are 
made in good faith—is in danger of being undermined. This note examines both sides of 
this issue in light of the policy goals of Title VII. The note then delves into the 
background of the case, analyzes the legal claims made by both parties, and then analyzes 
the Supreme Court’s ruling. possible outcomes of this case and the potential impact of 
these outcomes on similar future situations. Finally, the article asks whether the Court is 
able to find an appropriate middle-ground and how the Court’s new standard will be 
affect future litigation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Frank Ricci, a New Haven firefighter, spent months in preparation for a 
promotional exam.1 In addition to countless hours of study, he incurred 
additional personal costs to buy supplements and pay a friend to transcribe 
them to audio cassette in order to cope with his dyslexia.2 The results of the 
exam put Ricci in position for a promotion, but the overall results were regarded 
as troublesome by the City of New Haven and the New Haven Civil Service 
Board (CSB) because of the racially disproportionate results.3 The CSB and the 
City of New Haven found themselves wedged between the proverbial “rock and 
a hard place.” Voting to certify the results would make them vulnerable to a 
claim from minority applicants. However, refusing to certify the test results 
could potentially create a reverse discrimination claim from the successful 
applicants whose test results were nullified.4 
The issue in Ricci v. DeStefano is whether municipalities are subject to 
reverse discrimination claims under Title VII by refusing to certify test results 
 
1 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2010; MA University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, 2006; BA Central Washington University, 2004.  I would like to thank Professor Katharine T. 
Bartlett for all of her help and support during the writing process. I would also like to thank my wife 
Laura, and the rest of my family for their unending encouragement and love. 
*Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 145. 
 4. Id. 
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with an adverse impact on employees of a protected class.5 This note begins by 
providing a brief background of employment discrimination law and the policy 
behind Title VII. Next, this note discusses the background of the case in the 
context of employment law and Title VII. After analyzing the case, this note will 
introduce the legal issues that are implicated and assess the validity of each 
claim. Then, the final section examines analyzes the Supreme Court’s rulings 
and how the ruling will affect how lower courts treat similar situations in the 
future.  
II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
This section gives a brief background in employment discrimination law 
and addresses the legal mechanisms of Title VII that are necessary to understand 
the intricacies of the Ricci case. The important social policies behind Title VII will 
be analyzed as they relate to this case and to employment discrimination in 
general. 
A. The Law 
The 1960’s instituted sweeping change in society as well as in the field of 
employment law, highlighted by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 A 
key provision of the act is Title VII, which grants protection to employees from 
certain employment actions based on their status, such as race, sex, color, 
religion, or national origin.7 For example, an employer violates Title VII by 
refusing to hire an applicant because of the applicant’s race. Proscribing 
employment actions based on an employee’s status forces employers to consider 
the individual’s merits for the specific job and prohibits treatment based on 
conscious or unconscious stereotypes about their membership in a protected 
class.8 
Two ways that Title VII protects employees is by prohibiting disparate 
treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment occurs where an “employer 
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”9 Employees are only protected where the 
employer’s action affects the terms and conditions10 of their employment and 
where the action was ‘because of’ the employee’s membership in a protected 
class.11 Disparate treatment based on any such status is prohibited under Title 
 
 5. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci II), 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
894 (mem.) (U.S. Jan. 9, 2009) (No. 08-328). 
 6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 520-22 (2001) (examining 
contemporary solutions to more subtle and complex forms of employment discrimination). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976). 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-324 (1986-87). 
 9. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, n.15 (1977). 
 10. Minor v. Centocor, 457 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 11. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973). This requirement ensures 
causation between an employer’s actions and the motives behind the action. This element 
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VII; even a white male who gets fired because of his race or gender has a valid 
claim under Title VII, known as reverse discrimination.12 
In contrast, disparate impact occurs where an employer institutes what 
seems to be a neutral policy, “but that in fact fall[s] more harshly on one group 
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.”13 An employer 
would, under disparate impact, violate Title VII by requiring all secretaries to be 
5’6” or shorter, if this policy disproportionately prevented men from obtaining 
these positions and if the height requirement was not related to the actual 
performance of secretarial work.14 Disparate impact protection, however, does 
not extend to the majority and thus, a disparate impact claim may only be 
brought by a person in the minority.15 
Employment discrimination claims use a burden-shifting format. For 
example, in a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff is required to present a 
prima facie case of discrimination, which requires only a burden of production.16 
The burden then shifts to the employer to produce a plausible and legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason for the decision.17 The burden then shifts back to the 
plaintiff to persuade the factfinder that unlawful discrimination did occur by 
offering proof that discrimination was the sole motive or that it was a 
contributing factor to the adverse employment action.18 No matter how the 
 
differentiates between an employer, who may have racist attitudes, that fires a black employee 
because of a personality conflict, and an employer who fires a black employee because of a racial 
animus; the former being allowed under Title VII and the latter prohibited. The key distinction is 
that the first employee was fired for a job-related reason (getting along with supervisors) and the 
second employee was fired for a reason unrelated to that employee’s job performance (their race). 
See id. 
 12. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that Title VII prohibits “[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, 
minority or majority”). For an in-depth look at Griggs, see Michael Selmi, Was Disparate Impact Theory 
a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (2006). 
 13. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, n.15 (1977). “The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but 
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
Discriminatory tests are impermissible unless they are “predictive of or significantly correlated with 
important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which 
candidates are being evaluated.” 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1978). The correlation must be shown by 
professionally acceptable methods. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975). 
 14. If the height requirement was validly tied to the actual performance of a secretarial job, or 
was in some way necessary for the duties of a secretary, then the business necessity of such a 
requirement would provide an affirmative defense to a disparate impact claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k). Even if a requirement is a business necessity, it will not be allowed if there are other less 
discriminatory alternatives available. See id.; Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in 
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387 (1995-96). 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). Another key distinction between the two theories is that disparate 
treatment requires a showing of discriminatory intent, whereas disparate impact does not. See 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, n.15 (1977). 
 16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The prima facie standard is minimal, requiring proof 
that the plaintiff belongs to a protected group, that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment 
action at the hands of the defendant, and that the defendant was motivated to take such an action 
because of the plaintiff’s protected status. See id. 
 17. Id. Again, the burden at this stage is but one of production. 
 18. Id. at 804. Under a single-motive proof structure, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual, and that there exists an underlying intent to discriminate. 
Id. Under a mixed-motive structure, the plaintiff must prove the defendant took the plaintiff’s 
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employer makes the decision, “a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed 
unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and 
had a determinative influence on the outcome.”19 
B. The Policy 
Title VII established a new foundation that would shape the workforce as 
America entered the twentieth century. It arose out of a fundamental need of 
protection for employees, directly because discrimination had become 
commonplace in, and even a fundamental part of, the workforce. Title VII 
prohibits “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” that seek to limit or 
classify applicants for employment or deprive them of any employment 
opportunities.’20 Put more simply, Title VII makes “it an illegal practice to use 
race as a factor in denying employment.”21 Title VII even bans reverse 
discrimination, extending protection from minority to non-minority 
employees.22 
Title VII also promotes the idea that employees should be considered based 
on their individual merit as an employee, not based on assumptions about 
groups of people. The goal of Title VII is that criteria will measure the person for 
the job, not the person in the abstract; such assumptions or stereotypes are 
irrelevant to an individual’s performance on the job. Title VII also attempts to 
prevent unconscious stereotypes from impermissibly altering the workforce by 
prohibiting policies that may seem neutral on their face, but that discriminate 
when put into practice. In this way, “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barriers to employment” are prohibited, even if they operate “invidiously.”23 
Congress was also concerned about efficiency in America’s workforce, and 
felt that only through “fair and racially neutral employment and personnel 
decisions” could efficiency be maximized.24 The underlying theory is that 
diversity increases efficiency and maximizes value by assigning the best person 
for the job. From a societal perspective, diversity helps workers develop socially 
constructive skills, such as learning how to work well with different types of 
 
protected status into account, as one of many other reasons that factored into the defendant’s 
decision. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The result under a mixed-motive case 
is that damages may be limited if the defendant is able to prove that the same decision would have 
resulted even if the discriminatory motive had not entered into the decision-making process. See id. 
See also Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy 
Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982) (examining the causation requirements under mixed-
motive structures in comparison to pretext under a single motive structure). 
 19. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). Disparate impact claims also use a 
burden shifting format, but knowledge of such a format is unnecessary to understand Ricci. 
 20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 21. 110 CONG. REC. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
 22. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
 23. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). “Every individual employee is protected against both 
discriminatory treatment and against practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation.” 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455-56. 
 24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801. 
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people. Overall, Title VII views diversity as socially beneficial and intrinsically 
beneficial, such that diversity is good for its own sake.25 
Title VII encourages voluntary compliance by promoting voluntary 
settlement of employment discrimination claims, encouraging employers to 
implement preventative measures, and offering incentives for employers by 
easing the evidentiary burdens for employers who voluntarily comply with Title 
VII. Encouraging voluntary compliance benefits society as a whole, by instilling 
the idea that everyone has the right to equal employment opportunities. 
Transforming this concept into an internal entitlement, regulated privately, as 
well as enforcing it as an external requirement, regulated governmentally, leads 
to more effective compliance in society, which in turn reduces the institutional 
costs of regulation. In this area, voluntary affirmative action has been allowed as 
a way to improve on the past discrimination of a class of people in the 
workforce. Affirmative action does this by attempting to level the playing field, 
or make up for all of the structural and socio-economic disadvantages that 
minorities face in competing in an open market. 
III. RICCI V. DESTEFANO – A BACKGROUND 
This section will provide a brief overview of the case and its procedural 
history. Then, the significant facts will be presented and analyzed in relation to 
the perspectives of each party, which serve as an important backdrop to the 
analysis of the legal claims in the following section. 
A. Overview 
In late 2003, the New Haven Fire Department administered oral and 
written tests as part of the promotional process to reach the ranks of Lieutenant 
and Captain.26 A total of 118 applicants took the test, of which there were 68 
white applicants, 27 black applicants, and 23 Hispanic applicants.27 Based on the 
test results and the city’s hiring policies,28 zero African American applicants and 
only two Hispanic applicants would even be eligible for promotion.29 The New 
Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) then held hearings to determine whether or not 
to certify the results of the exam.30 During these meetings, the CSB was advised 
that the exam results showed a “very significant disparate impact.”31 Applicants, 
experts, and community leaders testified in support of both sides, and the 
 
 25. But see Matthew J. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live With Racial Inequality, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 87, 120-24 (2006) (contrasting diversity with social engineering). 
 26. Ricci II, 530 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2008) (Cabranes dissenting). 
 27. Id. 
 28. The city had instituted a ‘Rule of Three’ mandate that required a vacancy to be filled from 
among the three individuals with the highest cumulative score. Id. at 103. 
 29. Id. at 94. These numbers are based on immediate openings, but since test results remain 
active for 1-2 years, future openings would enable three African American applicants to be 
promoted to Lieutenant. See Supplemental Brief of Petitioners at 11, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428 
(U.S. Aug. 21, 2008). 
 30. See Ricci II, 530 F.3d at 104. 
 31. Id. at 104. 
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resulting vote of the CSB ended in a tie.32 Since a tie meant the results were not 
affirmatively certified, 18 applicants filed a reverse discrimination claim of 
disparate treatment in the District Court of Connecticut.33 
The District Court ruled in favor of the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment, and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.34 On 
appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed the ruling of the District Court with a summary order.35 The panel later 
withdrew the summary order and issued a per curiam opinion, which adopted 
the District Court’s ruling in toto.36 On a narrow majority vote, the Second 
Circuit opted not to rehear the case en banc.37 The Supreme Court, after hearing 
arguments, ruled in favor of the petitioners and reinstated the original test 
scores.38 
B. The Construction of the Test 
The promotional exam, prepared by Industrial/Organizational Solutions, 
Inc. (IOS), an independent test-making company, was constructed by issuing a 
questionnaire from a random sample of captains and lieutenants in order to 
highlight the most important skills for each position.39 Once the key skills were 
identified, the list was then sent to all captains and lieutenants who then 
assigned a ranking to the particular qualities/skills.40 The key qualities and 
skills identified were then used as the foundation in constructing the oral and 
written portions of the exam.41 As per the contract between the city and the 
firefighter’s union, the weight of the written portion was set at 60% and the 
weight of the oral portion at 40%.42 A cumulative score of 70 was set as the cut-
off score to determine a passing grade.43 Each portion of the exam was reviewed 
independently, and a syllabus was given to all applicants.44 All of the test 
questions came from the listed study materials, with the syllabus identifying 
specific chapters in the study materials.45 
The results of the test revealed “significant and unexpected racial 
disparities.”46 Out of the 41 applicants for Captain (with 8 black applicants and 8 
Hispanic applicants), only 2 Hispanic candidates would be eligible for the 7 
 
 32. See id. at 104-08. 
 33. Id. at 103, 108. 
 34. Id. at 94. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Ricci v. DiStefano (Ricci III), 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2678 (U.S. 2009) 
 39. Id. at 103; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428 (U.S. May 14, 
2008). 
 40. Ricci II, 530 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 41. Id. at 105. 
 42. Id. at 103. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147. 
 45. Ricci II, 530 F.3d 87 at 107. 
 46. Supplemental Brief of Respondents at 4, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2008). 
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openings.47 Out of the 77 applicants for Lieutenant (with 19 black applicants and 
15 Hispanic applicants), no minority candidates qualified for the 8 vacancies.48 
However, for the exam to remain valid, certification of the results was required 
by the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) in order to actually begin filling 
vacancies.49 
C. Two Perspectives on the Hearings 
The CSB held five public hearings to determine whether or not to certify 
the results of the exam.50 The vote by the CSB at the conclusion of the hearings 
ended in a tie, effectively denying certification of the test results. The hearings 
set the stage for the litigation that followed and provide a crucial insight on 
whether or not the exam was validly constructed and whether improper 
motives influenced the vote of the CSB. 
The petitioners claimed that nothing from the hearings proved the exam 
invalid. The hearings showed the great lengths that the City went to 
meticulously construct the test to assess the key skills and abilities of applicants 
in relation to the specific position.51 The preparers of the exam also sought to 
reduce racial disparity by over-representing minorities throughout each stage of 
development, by writing the exam below a tenth grade reading level, and by 
allowing candidates to take the oral portion regardless of their performance on 
the written portion.52 
The City, in contrast, argued that the hearings established deficiencies in 
the exam’s construction, which when combined with the racially disparate 
results, justified certification being refused. During the hearings, multiple 
experts testified that results showing such a severe racial disparity are a clear 
signal that the exam may be faulty. Additionally, IOS admitted that the chosen 
cut-off score of 70 did not actually reflect the minimal competence for 
promotion; in other words, it was chosen arbitrarily.53 The scores from the exam 
were to be ranked and promotions would be determined from the rankings, 
requiring precise scoring to reflect “better anticipated job performance” for each 
higher score.54 Yet IOS, in the testimony of a representative at one of the 
hearings, never testified that the calibration was “precise enough to be used to 
rank-order candidates.”55 
 
 47. Ricci II, 530 F.3d at 103. 
 48. Id. at 104. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Ricci III, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2678 (U.S. 2009). 
 52. Id. at 105-06. Supplemental Brief of Petitioners at 7-8, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428 (U.S. 
Aug. 21, 2008). The oral portion of the exam was also constructed to mitigate racial disparities by 
thoroughly training each evaluator and by requiring that each three-person evaluation panel have 
two minority evaluators. 
 53. See Supplemental Brief of Respondents at 30, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Nov. 13, 
2008). “Where cutoff scores are used, they should normally be set so as to be reasonable and 
consistent with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency within the work force.” 29 C.F.R. § 
1607.5. 
 54. Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 31, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428 (U.S. March 2009). 
 55. Id. 
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The motivation behind the vote for certification was crucial in determining 
if the City violated Title VII. The petitioners claimed that the City’s argument 
was merely pretext, to cover up for insufficiencies in the hearings and the 
political pressure that improperly influenced the CSB’s vote. To establish 
pretext, petitioners claimed that Boise Kimber, and influential leaders in the 
black community who had previously supported Mayor DeStefano, conspired 
with DeStefano to “privately push the board to scuttle the promotions.”56 
Destefano opposed certification because of the political ramifications of 
disappointing Kimber, and DeStefano even discussed making the hearings seem 
neutral and deliberate in order to cover up the racial and political motivations.57 
Further evidence of pretext was shown by the refusal of the CSB to allow two 
top New Haven Fire Department officials, who helped develop the test, and one 
of whom is black, to testify that the exam was “fair and valid.”58 
The City, on the other hand, claimed that legitimate concerns about the 
exam and the disparate results it produced, along with the duty to comply with 
Title VII, motivated the CSB’s decision. The validity and job-relatedness of the 
test was put in doubt during the hearings. Examples such as the lack of a valid 
cut-off score,59 the doubt regarding whether the test was calibrated to be precise 
enough to be used for rank-order scoring,60 the failure to review the test within 
the department,61 contradictory information in the source material,62 and the 
testing of irrelevant material63 left serious questions about the exam’s validity. 
Problems with the test and the development of the test, combined with the test’s 
racially disparate results, supported the City’s claim that they acted in good 
faith to voluntarily comply with Title VII. 
IV. ANALYZING THE LEGAL CLAIMS 
The petitioners in Ricci alleged that the City’s actions violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and/or Title VII. The majority of this section will analyze the 
Title VII claim, followed by a brief discussion about the Equal Protection Claim. 
The two main issues in the Title VII claim are whether the City was actually 
motivated by a duty to voluntarily comply with Title VII and whether the City 
was allowed, under Title VII, to refuse to act on the results of a test because of its 
racially disparate results. 
A. Motivation: Duty to Comply or a Mere Pretext for Discrimination? 
The focus of a disparate treatment claim is whether discriminatory intent 
motivated the employer’s decision. In a typical case, the employer proffers a 
legitimate reason for the decision, and the plaintiff must then persuade the 
 
 56. Id. at 11. 
 57. Id. at 31. 
 58. Id. at 14. 
 59. Id. at 3. 
 60. Id. at 31. 
 61. Id. at 4. 
 62. Id. at 7. 
 63. Id. 
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factfinder that the proffered reason is actually pretext for discrimination. When 
applying this standard to Ricci, the focus is whether the CSB’s decision was 
motivated by the race of the petitioners or by their proffered legitimate 
explanation, their duty to voluntarily comply with Title VII and avoid disparate 
impact discrimination. 
Although the evidentiary burden of production shifts in the preliminary 
stages of a disparate treatment case, the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier 
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff 
remains at all times with the plaintiff.”64 To meet this burden, the defendant’s 
legitimate reason must be shown to be a pretext for discrimination: that the 
defendant’s reasons were “not its true reasons,”65 and that they are “unworthy 
of credence.”66 Thus, a plaintiff may prevail by meeting its prima facie case and 
disproving the defendant’s explanation, but shall prevail by disproving the 
defendant’s reason and offering persuasive evidence that discriminatory intent 
actually motivated the decision.67 The Supreme Court found that the petitioners 
proffered enough evidence to prove that the City was motivated by 
discriminatory intent, and that “fear of litigation alone” could not justify 
refusing to certify the test.68 
In its decision, the Supreme Court dismisses any notion that the test was 
not job-related and consistent with business necessity.69 The Court states that 
there is “no genuine dispute” and that any claims to the contrary are blatantly 
contradicted by the record.70 However, the Court declines to address serious 
issues with the test, specifically the failure to establish an appropriate cut-off 
score for the exam, the failure to internally review the exam for inconsistencies, 
and the failure to precisely calibrate the scoring of the exam to correlate with a 
candidate’s expected job performance. The most likely interpretation of why 
these issues did not sway the Court is that the City did not ask for a follow-up 
report from IOS, which was offered, regarding the test’s consistency with EEOC 
guidelines for examination validation.71  The Court implicitly suggests that the 
City’s decision about the test’s validity had already been made prior to the CSB 
hearings, and that no amount of evidence pertaining to the validity of the exam 
would have persuaded the City that the test was not valid.72 Had the City 
requested the technical report from IOS and done more unbiased research into 
the exam’s validity, it is possible that the concerns found with the exam would 
have persuaded the Court to rule in the City’s favor. However, the City’s 
reactions to the exam results and its lack of follow-up with the creators of the 
 
 64. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 256. 
 67. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Disproving the 
proffered legitimate reason “is not always sufficient to sustain an ultimate finding of intentional 
discrimination.” Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1338 (1997). 
 68. See Ricci III, at 2680 
 69. Ricci III, at 2678. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 2679. 
 72. See id. (stating that the city “turned a blind eye to evidence that supported the exam’s 
validity”). 
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exam displayed an air of pretext, resulting in the Court’s finding for the 
petitioners. 
Another potential interpretation of the Supreme Court’s finding is that an 
exam need not be perfect, but only job-related and consistent with business 
necessity. Therefore, any deficiencies found in this exam only demonstrated that 
although the test was not perfect, the deficiencies were not significant enough to 
call into question the job-relatedness of the test. This, paired with the pretextual 
motive of the City, were enough to persuade the Supreme Court to overturn the 
lower court’s decision and rule in favor of the petitioners. 
Additionally, the Court found that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact that a less discriminatory alternative was available to the City.73 The City 
claimed that adjusting the weight of the scores, or that allowing the scores to be 
banded74, would create less discriminatory results.75 The Court correctly noted 
that both of these options would violate the Title VII prohibition on adjusting 
test scores.76 The City further argued that an available less discriminatory 
alternative was available, as evidenced by the testimony of Christopher Hornick 
who suggested the use of an ‘assessment center’ approach as a way to reduce 
discriminatory impact.77 The Court dismissed this contention because his overall 
testimony suggested that the City should certify the results and that this “brief 
mention. . .standing alone, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact.”78 
B. When can a Municipality Refuse to Certify Test Results? 
Petitioner’s claim that the City violated Title VII by refusing to certify the 
results of a valid promotional exam fails in three ways. Title VII proscribes 
certain types of use in relation to test scores: adjusting scores, using different 
cut-off scores, or otherwise altering scores on the basis of race.79 First, the City 
did not use the test scores. According to the plain meaning of the statute, Title 
VII bans only specific types of use when based on race and thus, a decision not 
to use a test cannot be deemed a “discriminatory use.”80 Second, declining to use 
a test is different than adjusting or altering test results. Once again, an 
adjustment or alteration suggests usage, and a decision not to use test results 
does not change the scores of the test-takers (which is prohibited), it nullifies the 
process. Legislative history speaks directly to this point, stating that the 
provision does not “require that test scores be used at all.”81 As previously 
discussed, the decision by the CSB was not made on the basis of race, although 
 
 73. Id. at 2679-81. 
 74. Banding is “the practice of rounding scores to the nearest whole number and considering all 
candidates with the same whole-number score as being of one rank.” Id. at 2679-80. 
 75. Id. at 2679-80. 
 76. Id. Allowing these actions would permit race-norming or other quota-systems that would 
potentially violate the Equal Protection Clause and would go against the overall goals of Title VII. 
 77. Id. at 2668-69. 
 78. Id. at 2680. 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l). 
 80. Id. Even the title of this particular statute, “Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores,” 
implicates it is restricting use, and not non-use. Id. 
 81. 137 CONG. REC. 15,472 (1991) (statement of Sen. Gore). 
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the disparate results signaled that the test might potentially be invalid, the 
decision was made because of concerns about the job-relatedness of the test and 
the test development process, as well as the availability of alternatives with less 
racial disparities.82 Finally, imposing a higher burden, such as a requirement to 
validate a test, “on a party seeking to comply voluntarily with Title VII is 
contrary to the case law and the statute’s underlying policy.”83 The heightened 
burden is specifically contrary to Title VII’s preference for voluntary 
compliance, since it requires a judicial determination before remedial action can 
be taken.84 Such a position contravenes the “strong preference for encouraging 
voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims.”85 
C. Equal Protection86 
The hallmark of the Equal Protection Clause is the tenet that “the 
government may not subject persons to unequal treatment based on race.”87 
Race-based classifications, those that explicitly distinguish “between people on 
the basis of some protected category,” are subject to strict scrutiny by courts.88 
However, merely being “conscious of race” in taking an action does not 
immediately subject the actor to strict scrutiny.89 The distinction between a racial 
classification and being ‘race-conscious’ strikes a balance between constitutional 
legislation using a “suspect tool” such as race to achieve an important goal and 
unconstitutional legislation using such classifications unnecessarily. Equal 
Protection also extends to a facially neutral law, providing it is motivated by 
 
 82. See supra, Part IV.A.1. 
 83. Bushey v. New York State Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 733 F.2d 220, 226 (1984). “The guidelines do 
not require or mandate a validity study where an employer decides against using a certain selection 
procedure that manifests” racially adverse impact. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 155 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981). 
 86. Since the Supreme Court decided Ricci on other grounds, the court did not consider the 
Equal Protection issue apparent in the case. See Ricci III, at 2681 (Scalia, concurring). 
 87. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 49 (1999). For an interesting article examining the 
tensions between equal protection and disparate impact law, specifically how equal protection could 
be used to invalidate disparate impact law, see Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate 
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494 (2003-2004). 
 88. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967). See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that “the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses 
of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant the use 
of a highly suspect tool”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (stating that classifications 
requiring strict scrutiny “are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling 
governmental interests”). For an in-depth study on City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., see Michael 
Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 7, 1729 (June 1989). 
 89. Hayden, 180 F.3d at 49. This brings out an interesting tension in Title VII’s underlying policy. 
Disparate treatment prohibits decisions based on race and thus discourages focusing on an 
employee’s race. However, disparate impact prohibits unintentional discrimination, and thus 
mandates employers to focus on the racial makeup of their workforce in order to avoid racially 
adverse practices. See also Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and 
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 5, 953 (Mar. 1993) (criticizing the 
‘colorblind’ movement by comparing transparency with discriminatory effect in employment 
discrimination law). 
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discriminatory intent90 and its application results in a discriminatory effect,91 or 
if the law is applied in a discriminatory fashion.92 
Petitioners characterized the City’s refusal to certify the results of the 
promotional exam as “a race-based government action grounded solely on the 
racial distribution of the test results.”93 The main problem with this 
characterization is that it relies on cases where race was specifically taken into 
account in the decision to promote, whether by race-norming the test results or 
by race-based eligibility lists.94 In contrast, the City’s decision not to certify the 
test results and to pursue other less discriminatory measures is not a racial 
classification because it does not treat candidates “differently on account of their 
race.”95 Petitioners rely on the City’s “race-coded list” as proof of racial 
classification, yet the EEOC requires employers to keep such lists to record the 
racial impact of employment practices.96 Courts have consistently exempted 
actions from strict scrutiny that are “necessarily conscious of race” as long as the 
actions treat “all persons equally.”97 The City should not be subjected to strict 
scrutiny merely by being aware of a racial disparate impact and taking action to 
avoid such disparity, since certification was denied for all candidates, regardless 
of their race. 
Petitioners also claim, in the alternative, that the decision of the CSB was 
motivated by discriminatory intent and had a discriminatory effect on the 
successful candidates because of their race.98 Yet petitioners try to prove 
discriminatory intent by pointing to the City’s awareness of racial disparity, and 
as such should be subject to strict scrutiny because they were motivated to 
remedy disparate impact due to race.99 Case law, however, is well established 
that an “intent to remedy the disparate impact [of] the prior exams is not 
equivalent to an intent to discriminate against non-minority applicants.”100 
Further, Congress actually mandates “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and 
 
 90. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (finding that discriminatory intent is 
evident when a decision-maker selects a “particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not 
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). 
 91. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977). 
 92. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). See also Hayden, 180 F.3d at 49 (ruling that a 
test administered uniformly to all applicants did not implicate an express racial classification). 
 93. Pet. Brief at 18, Docket Nos. 07-1428, 08-328. 
 94. See Williams v. Pharmacia, 137 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir.1998); Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 
F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 95. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 537 (1982). 
 96. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(A) (stating that employers “should maintain and have available for 
inspection records or other information which will disclose the impact which its tests and other 
selection procedures have upon employment opportunities of persons by identifiable race, sex, or 
ethnic group”). 
 97. Hayden at 49. Mechanisms that “are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment 
based on a classification” are unlikely to demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible. Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment). 
 98. This is assuming that the test is in fact valid, since there are no “vested rights,” Billish v. 
City of Chicago, 989 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Posner, J.), in a “wrongfully awarded job 
to which another is entitled,” Croson, 488 U.S. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 99. Pet. Brief at 18, Docket Nos. 07-1428, 08-328. 
 100. Hayden at 51. 
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unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to 
discriminate.”101 Accordingly, the City’s actions should not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 
The district court’s proffered test for liability would have established that 
“a public employer, when faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact 
liability under Title VII, does not violate Title VII of the Equal Protection Clause 
by taking facially neutral, albeit race-conscious, actions to avoid liability.”102 The 
district court tried to balance the interests of Title VII with the Equal Protection 
Clause, but the ruling was too broad. A municipality’s “desire to mitigate or 
avoid disparate impact does not justify preferential treatment for any group,”103 
and merely requiring a prima facie disparate impact case to invoke a blanket 
defense of voluntary compliance opens the door for potential abuse. Since, in 
some cases, a prima facie disparate impact case can be made by relying on 
results alone, a municipality could avoid any further showing or investigation 
into the test, and deny the results based solely on the race of the successful 
candidates. Judge Cabranes, in his dissenting opinion, feared that “municipal 
employers could reject the results of an employment examination whenever 
those results failed to yield a desired racial outcome.”104 This would create a 
quota-like system, yet benefit employers by allowing them to avoid liability and 
proper judicial scrutiny.105 Applying this test allows a potential defense based 
on a showing of numbers alone, allowing for potential abuse by closing off 
inquiry into the motivations of the municipality and by preventing a finding of 
pretext. 
In reversing the district court, the Supreme Court ruled that “fear of 
litigation alone” cannot justify race-based disparate treatment.106 The court 
borrowed the strong-basis-in-evidence standard (Strong Basis Test) from cases 
involving the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to determine 
when certain race-based remedial actions by governmental entities are 
constitutional.107 In applying this standard, the Supreme Court sought to read 
disparate treatment and disparate impact prohibitions together.108 Requiring a 
higher burden of production from municipalities prevents a ‘blanket defense’109 
to liability and also safeguards the legitimate expectations of employees. The 
 
 101. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 102. Ricci II, 530 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (Parker, J., concurring). 
 103. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 684. 
 104. Id. at 98. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Ricci III, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2681 (U.S. 2009). 
 107. Id. at 2675. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Allowing a ‘blanket defense’ to disparate treatment claims based on a subjective fear of 
liability for disparate impact would diminish the effectiveness of employment discrimination law. 
This would allow any employer in a similar scenario to claim that they took action for fear of 
liability, even if this fear is objectively unreasonable. The ‘blanket defense’ would also curb 
voluntary compliance because employers armed with such a wide-reaching defense would be less 
worried about litigation and thus less motivated to take preventative measures.  
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new standard also follows logically with established precedent that prohibits the 
race-norming of test results.110 Since the changing of test results to create a 
racially preferable workplace is not allowed, it follows that throwing out test 
results because the results are not racially preferable should also be 
prohibited.111 
The Supreme Court then applied the standard to the facts of the case and 
issued summary judgment in favor of the petitioners.112 The City relied on the 
disparate results of the test in choosing not to certify the exam, but did not 
sufficiently proffer enough evidence that the exam was not justified by business 
necessity or that a less prejudicial alternative existed at the time.113 
A. Is the Strong Basis Test the Correct Standard? 
The Strong Basis Test, as applied in Ricci, requires that governmental 
agencies go beyond a mere prima facie showing of disparate impact liability.114 
There must also be a strong-basis-in-evidence that the exam is not a business 
necessity or that there is a less prejudicial means of testing.115 In adopting this 
standard, the majority relied on Croson and Wygant, both Equal Protection cases 
where race was the “decisive factor.”116 
The dissent argues against the Strong Basis Test, in favor of a less 
demanding standard. Employers would not be subject to disparate treatment 
liability if they had reasonable doubts about the reliability of the scores.117 This 
standard seems to give an employer who is striving to voluntarily comply with 
Title VII the benefit of the doubt, as long as it has “good cause to believe the 
[testing] device would not withstand examination for business necessity.”118 
This standard is likened to affirmative action cases, where under an affirmative 
action plan race is an acceptable consideration if race is only “one of numerous 
factors.”119 
Both the majority and the dissent offer a compelling analysis of prior case 
law and a persuasive argument for applying each standard. This begs the 
question, which standard is better? Unfortunately, the answer to this question 
depends on which underlying policy of Title VII the “decider” thinks is more 
important. The dissent aptly criticizes the majority’s lack of clarity in applying 
the Strong Basis Test, as key questions are left unanswered, and will no doubt be 
litigated in the lower courts for years to come.120 By suggesting a less stringent 
standard, the dissent similarly neglects to adequately clarify the threshold for its 
 
 110. Ricci III, at 2676. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 2664. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 2675-76. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Ricci III, dissent, at 2701. 
 117. Ricci III, dissent, at 2699. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987). 
 120. See Ricci III, dissent, at 2699, 2701. 
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proffered standard.121 The Strong Basis Test borders on being too strict a 
standard and it is unclear where a showing of a strong-basis-in-evidence begins 
and having to establish a “provable, actual violation” ends.122 In the same vein, 
the dissent’s standard borders on being too permissive, failing to clarify what 
exactly constitutes reasonable doubts about an exam’s reliability, and when 
exactly an employer has “good cause” to doubt business necessity.123 
Each side also champions different policy justifications to rationalize its 
preferred standard. Under the dissent’s more lenient standard, a benefit of the 
doubt is given to employers who are presented with disparate results of 
employment practices, reasonably doubt the dubious practices, and seek to 
voluntarily comply with Title VII by suspending the suspicious practices in 
order to prevent further disparate impact.124 This rule, if implemented, is 
potentially dangerous because the standard of proof is low, and seemingly 
subjective, in that it is dependent on the belief of the employer that an 
employment practice is not a business necessity. Thus, in the name of voluntary 
compliance, the courts could potentially be sanctioning a defense to disparate 
treatment that could be easily abused.125 Additionally, such a low standard 
presents a danger of instituting de facto quota systems, which is also inapposite 
to the goals of Title VII.126 
The dissent argues that the Strong Basis Test is vague, potentially too strict, 
and thwarts the Title VII policy to encourage voluntary compliance.127 While 
this criticism indeed has its merit, a more stringent standard in cases such as 
Ricci is logically appropriate. In Ricci, New Haven wanted to throw the test 
results out (an action that is definitely disparate treatment) because of the 
racially disparate results of the promotional exam (which may or may not have 
been the result of illegal disparate impact).128 A stricter test is justified because in 
order to engage in disparate treatment, an employer should have to show more 
than a mere possibility of disparate impact. 
Consider a “smoke without fire”129 scenario where a municipality uses a 
promotional exam that distinguishes the most qualified candidates for a 
particular job, but it just so happens that the results of the exam would promote 
all candidates of one protected status and no candidates of another. While the 
object of disparate impact law is to “smoke out” employment practices caused 
by non-business related discrimination (fire), in this scenario there is smoke but 
there is no fire because the test produces dubious results but is not 
discriminatory. Under the majority’s standard, the municipality would not be 
 
 121. Id. at 2699. 
 122. Ricci III, at 2676. 
 123. Ricci III, dissent, at 2699. 
 124. Id. 
 125. That is to say that employers could, in bad faith, argue good faith compliance to escape 
liability. 
 126. Ricci III, at 2675. 
 127. See Ricci III, dissent, at 2699-2702. 
 128. This argument is based on the assumptions that throwing the test results out was in fact an 
adverse employment action and that the racially disparate results were the decisive factor for the 
CSB’s decision. 
 129. An allusion to the epistemological musings of the Carvakan school of Indian philosophy. 
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able to throw out the results. However, under the dissent’s more permissive 
standard, the municipality may very well be able to “voluntarily comply” and 
dismiss the results as long as they can prove that they had good cause to believe 
the exam “would not withstand examination for business necessity.”130 The 
municipality would not need to show that the test did not actually conform to 
the requirement of business necessity, just that there was good cause to be 
concerned about the reliability of the test. The dissent’s standard is equally as 
vague as the Strong Basis Test, but it causes more concern because of a potential 
for abuse by employers discriminating under the guise voluntary compliance. 
B. Is this the Correct Application of the Standard? 
After establishing a new standard, the majority issued summary judgment 
in favor of the petitioners, ruling that no genuine issue of material fact existed to 
dispute the claim that the CSB considered only the racially disparate results in 
making its decision.131 The dissent points out that the ruling overlooks the 
problems inherent in the test and the availability of less discriminatory 
alternative methods of testing.132 No business justification was given for the 
60/40 ratio for weighting the written and oral portions133 and alternative 
methods with less discriminatory impact were discussed in the CSB hearings. In 
reaching its decision, the majority overlooks the minor flaws involved in 
creating the test, creating an emphasis that an employment practice need only be 
“consistent with business necessity” and not perfectly business related.134 The 
majority also emphasizes that racial considerations can be taken into account 
when creating a test in an effort to minimize disparate racial impact, but once 
the test has been given, allowing a municipality to reject the results based almost 
exclusively on the racial make-up of the results is akin to a quota system, and is 
illegal under Title VII.135 
Two factors in Ricci may have swayed the majority in regards to the 
availability of less discriminatory alternative methods of testing available to 
New Haven. First, New Haven was constrained by their agreement with the 
union on requiring a 60/40 weight given to the written and oral portions of the 
exam.136 The dissent questions the business necessity of this requirement,137 but 
a possible explanation for this rationale is that the majority’s conclusion 
implicitly gives deference to such bargained-for agreements. Alternatively, the 
majority’s conclusion in this regard may in fact mean that other less 
discriminatory methods were not available, since the other methods discussed 
would have weighted the scores differently and were therefore precluded by the 
union agreement. 
 
 130. Ricci III, dissent, at 2699. 
 131. Ricci III. 
 132. See Ricci III, dissent, at 2702-07. 
 133. Id. at 2699, n.5. 
 134. See Title VII, 703(k). 
 135. See Ricci III, at 2676-77. 
 136. Id. at 2665. 
 137. Ricci III, dissent, at 2699, n.5. 
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Additionally, less discriminatory methods that were available only 
garnered passing reference in a few of the hearings.138 When alternative 
methods were mentioned, they were only mentioned generically, no specific 
methods were discussed in detail nor were specific alternative methods of 
testing proposed.139 Since so much of the debate and deliberations during the 
CSB hearings focused on the racially disparate results and the business necessity 
of the test, the majority may have considered this proof that the decision was 
based on the racially disparate results, and not that the CSB had alternative 
methods in mind when voting not to certify. Future courts may distinguish Ricci 
from other cases where more discussion and consideration is given to business 
necessity and alternative methods of testing or where bargained-for agreements 
on testing methods are not present. 
VI. BALANCING ACT – DOES THE SUPREME COURT FIND A MIDDLE-GROUND? 
The scope of a precedential ruling must be broad enough to allow future 
applications in similar, but not necessarily exact, conditions, but must also avoid 
being so broad that it applies to situations it was not intended for. In 
employment discrimination, a new rule must further Title VII without violating 
the Equal Protection Clause. A rule should also carefully balance the overall 
interests of employees, employers, and the government. 
The Strong Basis Test tries to balance the competing interests of employers, 
employees, and the government in a way that is consistent with Title VII and the 
Equal Protection Clause. Although it is unclear how the rule will be applied, 
future government entities are on notice that more than fear of litigation is 
required. It is also unclear how this new standard will affect voluntary 
compliance from employers. 
This approach serves the interests of employees by requiring a heightened 
standard of proof for the employer. In order to avoid liability, the employer 
must go beyond the numbers, and investigate the test itself and the testing 
process.140 Requiring this inquiry prevents an employer from using an 
“unsubstantiated fear” of a disparate impact suit as pretext for discrimination.141 
Likewise, employees also benefit from a bona fide defense for employers 
because the defense is grounded in scrutinizing a test’s job-relatedness. 
Improving the correlation between testing criteria and actual job performance 
increases an employer’s ability to choose the best individual for the job, thus 
benefiting employer and employee alike. The Strong Basis Test also serves the 
interests of the government by retaining the integrity of Title VII by providing 
an avenue between the ‘rock and a hard place’ that future employers may find 
themselves in, while still mandating equal opportunities for employees. 
Courts have established that “voluntary compliance is a preferred means of 
achieving Title VII’s goal of eliminating employment discrimination.”142 
 
 138. See Ricci III, at 2667-71. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Ricci III, at 2675. 
 141. See Pet. Brief on the Merits at 28-32 (Nos. 07-1428 & 08-328). 
 142. Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correc. Serv., 711 F.2d 1117, 1128 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
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Congress offers incentives to employers to implement internal regulations and 
increase compliance rates, while simultaneously reducing the burden of 
regulation imposed on the government. However, it is unclear how the Strong 
Basis Test will affect voluntary compliance. The dissent warns that using the 
new standard will reduce voluntary compliance because of the current 
uncertainty as to how courts will apply the Strong Basis Test, compounded by 
the fact that the majority has offered little guidance on applying this test in Title 
VII cases.143 The Strong Basis Test may impose so high a burden on 
governmental entities that it may actually be in their best interests not to 
voluntarily comply, at the risk of costly litigation or a fear of future liability. 
Voluntary compliance is the touchstone of Title VII because it is the most 
effective way to reduce employment discrimination, it reduces policing and 
enforcement costs on the government, and it reduces litigation costs by giving 
incentives to proactive employers.144 Due to current uncertainty, the courts are 
now faced with the challenge of developing a uniform and consistent approach 
to the Strong Basis Test that is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s ruling and 
does not disincentivize employers from voluntarily complying with Title VII. In 
doing so, the government’s interest will be furthered by promoting equal 
employment opportunities and abolishing arbitrary barriers to employment.145 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Ricci case presents difficulties for future courts, left in the dark as to 
how to apply the Strong Basis Test. Ricci also leaves considerable uncertainty for 
future municipalities trying to voluntarily comply with the requirements of Title 
VII. The Supreme Court made it clear that “fear of litigation alone” does not 
justify disparate treatment, but where future district courts will draw the line is 
unclear.146 In addition to a lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, there 
remains continued uncertainty if disparate treatment is ever constitutional.147 By 
requiring more than just a prima facie threat of disparate impact liability, the 
new standard does guard against creating a ‘blanket defense’ against liability 
that would allow employers to discriminate under the guise of diversity, thus 
nullifying the protections afforded by Title VII. The new standard tries to create 
a middle-ground that protects the interests of all parties and furthers voluntary 
compliance under Title VII. This will only be accomplished if lower courts apply 
the Strong Basis Test uniformly, which is unlikely given the lack of guidance for 
doing so from the Supreme Court. Future municipalities are left to wonder 
when enough evidence exists that will justify disregarding promotional exam 
results, if ever. 
 
 
 143. Ricci III, dissent at 2701-02. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
 146. Ricci III, at 2681. 
 147. See Ricci III, Scalia, J. concurring at 2682. 
